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1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of international portfolio choice based on the pat-
tern of comparative advantage in goods trade. Countries have varying degrees
of similarity in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject to aggregate pro-
ductivity (country-specic) shocks. Risk averse consumers can insure against
these shocks by investing their wealth at home and abroad. The change in
relative prices after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance
to countries that have dissimilar specialization patterns, but is bad news for
countries with similar specialization patterns, since their incomes will worsen.
Therefore countries with similar comparative advantages have got a stronger
incentive to invest in one another for insurance purposes than countries with
dissimilar comparative advantages.
Empirical evidence linking bilateral international investment positions to a
proxy for relative factor endowment similarity supports our theory. We estimate
a gravity equationin which, after controlling for commodity and asset market
frictions, the similarity of host and source countries in their relative capital-
labor ratios has got a positive e¤ect on the source countrys investment position
in the host country. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the host countrys
GDP size, as larger countries have a stronger e¤ect on world prices.
The main body of the paper starts by presenting a one-period model in which
countries trade Arrow-Debreu securities in a complete asset markets environ-
ment prior to the realization of uncertainty. Countries di¤er in their relative
factor endowments and have di¤erent patterns of specialization; thus, they also
exchange commodities once uncertainty about their productivities is realized.
A positive productivity shock in a capital-abundant country, for example, will
alter relative prices (raising wage rates and reducing the return to capital),
thus raising the incomes of labor-abundant countries and harming the incomes
of other capital-abundant countries. The latter countries therefore have got a
stronger incentive to buy the Arrow-Debreu security corresponding to this state
of nature, which is sold by the country that experiences the shock.
Since our theoretical mechanism works through the e¤ects of shocks on rel-
ative prices, the size of the country su¤ering the shock is obviously a relevant
consideration. In a generalization of our model, we study how endowment sim-
ilarity interacts with country size. We show that, under realistic assumptions,
an investor country invests relatively more in a large-similar country than in a
small-similar country, and relatively less in a large-dissimilar country than in a
small-dissimilar country.
The intuitions of our model do not hinge on the many strong assumptions
(Arrow-Debreu securities, complete asset markets, absence of home bias in port-
folios) we make for tractability purposes: when we replace the Arrow-Debreu
setup with a more realisticnancial side, the model yields predictions similar
to those of our stylized model: we assume that countries can exchange claims on
their GDPs before uncertainty is realized, and that investing abroad is subject
to frictions that reduce the expected return of foreign assets. This obviously
generates a home bias in the portfolios of countries. By the same line of rea-
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soning as above, investing in countries with similar factor endowment ratios
provides better insurance to a country with a home-biased portfolio.
The idea that relative price changes may act as an insurance mechanism
can be traced back to Cole and Obstfeld [4], who argued this might explain the
lack of international diversication of country portfolios. In their model, two
completely specialized countries trade with each other in assets and outputs.
But asset trade is almost redundant, as changes in the terms of trade after a
shock act as insurance. By allowing for many countries with varying degrees of
comparative advantage similarity, we turn this intuition into a theory of inter-
national portfolio choice. Unlike Cole and Obstfeld [4], however, the emphasis
of our model is not on the terms of trade, but on factor prices. Think of the
standard indeterminacy problem of the production structures of countries in a
Heckscher-Ohlin model with more goods than production factors. In that en-
vironment, it is di¢ cult to talk about the terms of trade of countries, as the
latter depend on the countriesproduction structures. But the model does have
instead unambiguous predictions about the behavior of factor prices, as these
do not depend on production structures.
Our model consists of endowment economies as in Lucas [18] and Svensson
[26]. We allow countries to di¤er in their patterns of specialization according to
their relative factor endowments, in a manner similar to Helpman and Razin [9]
and Helpman [8]. In comparison with these references, however, we only allow
for country-specic aggregate productivity shocks in our analysis.
Our work adds to a growing body of research that attempts to explain the
international portfolio choices of countries. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [22] and Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti [17] have put emphasis on commodity trade costs; Martin
and Rey [19] and [20] have focused on the role of size; and Portes and Rey [23]
have highlighted the importance of informational costs for investment ows.1
In comparison with these references, our paper highlights that bilateral portfo-
lio positions not only depend on frictions between countries, but also on other
country-pair specic characteristics. In our theory, even in the absence of fric-
tions (or when bilateral frictions are equal across all country-pairs) is it possible
that a country nds it optimal not to invest the same amount across countries.
Finally, the causal direction from asset trade to production specialization
has been addressed by Koren [10]. He argues that frictions in international
asset markets prevent countries from specializing (as much as they would in a
frictionless world), due to the inability to insure against sector-specic produc-
tivity shocks. Our paper complements Korens work by pointing that causality
might also run in the opposite direction: the production structures of countries
determines their international portfolio positions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses a styl-
ized model linking production specialization and international portfolio choice.
Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy, while Section 4 discusses empirical
evidence supportive of the model. Some concluding remarks follow. Finally, the
1For other approaches to international portfolio choice, see also Kraay and Ventura [12]
and [13], Kraay et al. [11], and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [15] and [16].
3
appendix provides proofs and extensions of the model discussed in Section 2.
2 The Model
Let us denote countries with j 2 J . Abusing notation, we will also use J to de-
note the number of countries. Each country has got a representative consumer,
who maximizes expected utility E [U (Cj)]. E () is the expectations operator,
and U () is the utility function, which we assume concave: U 0 () > 0, U 00 () < 0.
C denotes consumption of a freely traded nal composite good,
Cj = C
1
2
1jC
1
2
2j ; (1)
where Ci denotes consumption of freely traded intermediate good i, i = 1; 2.
Preferences are identical across countries.
Technologies in the intermediate good industries are also identical across
countries. We simplify by assuming linear production functions:2 y1j = AjKj
and y2j = AjLj , where yij denotes production of good i in country j, and
Aj > 0 denotes country js aggregate productivity level. We can think of AjKj
and AjLj as production factors measured in e¢ ciency units. We assume perfect
competition.
Each country has got exogenously given endowments of the two production
factors, which are internationally immobile and supplied inelastically. We dis-
tinguish two subsets of countries, which we denote with k and l: Jk [ Jl = J ,
Jk \ Jl = ?.3 For all k 2 Jk, l 2 Jl,
Kk = k (1=2 + ) ; (2)
Lk = k (1=2  ) ; (3)
Kl = l (1=2  ) ; (4)
Ll = l (1=2 + ) : (5)
 2 [0; 1=2]. Notice this implies countries in Jk have got a comparative advan-
tage in good 1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume Jk = Jl = J=2. The
parameter j > 0 is a scaling factor that allows for cross-country di¤erences in
size. We assume that the distributions of this scaling factor within Jk and Jl
are symmetric.
Aj is ex-ante uncertain. We assume there are J states of nature (denoted
by s, s = 1; :::; J), each with identical probability  (s) = 1=J . States of nature
are characterized by productivity level vectors
A (s) = [A1 (s) ; A2 (s) ; :::; AJ (s)] :
2 In Appendix B we show that this assumption is harmless: a model with neoclassical
production functions yields similar insights.
3To avoid confusion, we will spare the indices j and j0 for when we refer to any country in
J ; we will use k and k0 to refer to countries in Jk; and l and l0 to refer to countries in Jl.
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In particular,
A (1) = (1 + a; 1; :::; 1) ;
A (2) = (1; 1 + a; :::; 1) ;
:::
A (J) = (1; :::; 1; 1 + a) ;
where a > 0 is a constant.4
There is a world market in which agents can buy or sell Arrow-Debreu con-
tingent claims before uncertainty is realized. These claims have payo¤s that
depend on the state of nature: the owner (seller) of the security receives (pays)
worth one unit of the nal good if state s occurs, but nothing in any other state.
We assume asset-market completeness.
2.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
Given the homotheticity of C (), relative demands depend only on relative
prices. Goods market equilibrium is therefore determined by
y1W
y2W
=
C1W
C2W
=
C1j
C2j
=
p2
p1
=
w
r
; (6)
where CiW 
P
j2J Cij and yiW 
P
j2J yij . Notice that pi is also the price of
the factor used in industry i when factors are measured in e¢ ciency units. This
can be seen from the equilibrium pricing conditions: p1 = r and p2 = w, where
r and w denote, respectively, the price of factor AK and factor AL. Taking the
nal good as the numeraire,
r =
1
2

LW
KW
 1
2
; (7)
w =
1
2

KW
LW
 1
2
; (8)
where KW 
P
j2J AjKj and LW 
P
j2J AjLj . Obviously, w=r = KW =LW .
Notice that free trade and the pricing conditions imply factor price equalization
across countries, as in Treer [27] or Ventura [28].
2.2 Asset Market Equilibrium
Let Bj (s) denote country js net purchase of state-s Arrow-Debreu securities.
Let p (s) denote the price of one such security. Each countrys utility maximiza-
tion problem can be expressed as
max
fBj(s)gJs=1
X
s
 (s)U [Yj (s) +Bj (s)] ; (9)
4This is similar to what Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1] and Martin and Rey [19], [20] assume
in di¤erents contexts.
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subject to budget constraintsX
s
p (s)Bj (s) = 0; (10)
Cj (s) = Yj (s) +Bj (s) : (11)
Manipulating the rst order conditions for states s and s0,
 (s)U 0 [Cj (s)]
 (s0)U 0 [Cj (s0)]
=
p (s)
p (s0)
: (12)
Market clearing requires
P
j Bj (s) = 0 and YW (s) =
P
j Cj (s) for all s, where
YW denotes world production of the nal good. Finally, we close the model with
the no-arbitrage condition
P
s p (s) = 1:
Under log-utility (U (C) = ln (C)), for example, the model yields the follow-
ing equilibrium asset prices and portfolio choices:
p (s) =
[YW (s)]
 1P
s0 [YW (s
0)] 1
; (13)
Bj (s) =
1
J
"X
s0
Yj (s
0)
YW (s0)
#
YW (s)  Yj (s) : (14)
The intuition underlying these expressions is rather straightforward. The rela-
tive price of a security depends inversely on the relative abundance of the nal
good in the corresponding state of nature. Regarding the rst term on the
right-hand side of equation (14), the size of country js portfolio will be larger
the higher its average output relative to the worlds output. As for the second
term, country js purchase of state-s security is inversely related to country js
state-s nal-good output.
2.3 International Portfolio Choice
We now discuss the e¤ects of ex-ante uncertainty in the goods markets on the
portfolio choices of countries. To build up intuition, we discuss the models
implications on endowment similarity and country size separately. We start by
assuming that all countries are of equal size. We then relax this assumption.
2.3.1 The Role of Endowment Similarity
Let us initially simplify the model by assuming away country-size e¤ects: j = 1
for all j 2 J . Dene a countrys gross domestic product as
Yj = rAjKj + wAjLj : (15)
Without loss of generality, consider country k 2 Jk. In states of nature in which
any country l 2 Jl has got a high productivity level, country ks GDP improves
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due to a price e¤ect, whereas states of nature in which any country k0 2 Jk,
k0 6= k, has got a high productivity draw bring about a negative price e¤ect
on country ks income. Country ks GDP is highest when its own productivity
level is high: the negative e¤ect of the change in relative prices is smaller than
the positive e¤ect on output of the productivity increase. Appendix A shows
Yk (k) >
1
J
YW > Yk (l) > Yk (k
0) ; (16)
where YW 
P
j Yj (s) for all s. A country therefore has got a stronger in-
centive to insure against states of nature in which countries with similar factor
endowment ratios have got a high productivity level. And the obvious provider
of such insurance is the country that experiences high productivity: the models
symmetry implies Yk0 (k0) > 1J YW > Yl (k
0) > Yk (k0).5
Given the models symmetry and the absence of aggregate uncertainty, we
conjecture the equilibrium exhibits full insurance. It is easy to nd asset prices,
consumption and portfolio allocations such that all the equilibrium conditions
hold and countries manage to fully insure:
p (s) =  (s) =
1
J
; (17)
Cj (s) =
1
J
YW ; (18)
Bj (s) =
1
J
YW   Yj (s) ; (19)
for all j; s. This result not only holds for log-utility, but for any concave utility
function.
We can now characterize the international portfolios of countries:
1. Assume  > 0. Consider state of nature k0. From (16) and (19),
Bk (k
0) > Bl (k0) > 0 > Bk0 (k0) :
Country k0 sells insurance against state k0 to all other countries. The
models symmetry implies Bk (k0) > Bk (l) > 0 > Bk (k). The share in
country ks international portfolio is larger for assets issued by a country
with a similar factor endowment ratio than for assets issued by the other
type of country.
2. In Appendix A we show Bk (k0) Bl (k0) = Yl (k0)  Yk (k0) = 2aYW 2  0.
Thus,
lim
!0
[Bk (k
0) Bl (k0)] = 0:
5 In this two-good two-factor model there is an obvious equivalence between factor en-
dowment similarity, production structure similarity, and terms of trade correlations. As we
discuss in Appendix B, however, this is a particular feature of the 2x2 model that breaks
down if there are more goods than factors; in this case, the production structures of countries
are undetermined, but the implications of our model for factor prices remain unaltered. In
general, therefore, our results are driven by the role of factor endowment similarity and its
implications for factor prices rather than by similarities in production structures or by terms
of trade correlations.
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When comparative advantage di¤erences are small, countries k and l do
not di¤er in their investment decisions regarding country k0. For low values
of , all countries have very similar production patterns. Thus, a shock
to any particular country will hardly have an important e¤ect on factor
prices; in this case, any two countries will take identical positions in any
third country.6
3. One can also show
lim
!1=2
Bl (k
0) = 0 < lim
!1=2
Bk (k
0) ;
or, by symmetry, lim
!1=2
Bk (l) = 0 < lim
!1=2
Bk (k
0). With complete spe-
cialization and a unitary elasticity of substitution, relative prices o¤er
complete insurance against shocks in countries with di¤erent specializa-
tion patterns.
4. Dene the following elasticity:
 
Bk(k0) Bk(l)
Bk(l)Kk0L
k0
 KkLk
 KlLl  KkLk KlLl  KkLk 
=   2
2 
a
J + 1
  
1
4   2
 :
 describes how country ks relative position in countries k0 and l depends
on the relative endowment di¤erence between these two host countries. It
is easy to see d jj =d > 0:7 as the dissimilarity between host and source
country rises, the source countrys portfolio becomes more responsive.8
2.3.2 The Role of Size
We now allow for di¤erences in country size, as we assumed initially. For
tractability purposes, we consider the log-utility case (see equations (13) and
(14)). For a given level of endowment similarity, we study how the host countrys
6For  = 0, our model is similar to the one-good standard textbook treatment. See, for
example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [21], chapter 5.
7Expressions for Bk (k0) and Bk (l) can be found in Appendix A.
8To assess the sensitivity of our results, we simulated the model above with
Cj =
h
(C1j)
" 1
" + (C2j)
" 1
"
i "
" 1
;
where " > 1 is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between goods 1 and 2. (We assumed
J = 4 and a = 0:02, and for di¤erent values of " and .) Result 1 holds for any nite
elasticity: Bk0 (k0) is always negative and, as long as goods 1 and 2 are not perfect substitutes,
Bk (k
0) > Bl (k0) > 0. Result 2 obviously holds for any ", since it only depends on all
countries being identical in their relative factor endowments. Result 3 depends instead on
the (unitary) elasticity of substitution implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form in (1).
Higher elasticities of substitution imply a lower response of prices to productivity shocks, and
a positive Bl (k0). Result 4, however, does not depend on the value of ": jj depends positively
on  also for " > 1. These results are available upon request.
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size a¤ects the positions of investor countries. For this purpose, we compare the
portfolio choices of two investor countries, k 2 Jk and l 2 Jl, with the same size
(k = l), across host countries k
0; k00 2 Jk with di¤erent sizes (k0 < k00).
From (13) and (14),
p (k0) [Bk (k0) Bl (k0)] = 1P
s0 [YW (s
0)] 1

Yl (k
0)  Yk (k0)
YW (k0)

; (20)
where k0 2 Jk. The term
P
s0 [YW (s
0)] 1 is constant. Hence, all we need to
analyze is the behavior of the term
Yl (k
0)  Yk (k0)
YW (k0)
=
r (k0) (Kl  Kk) + w (k0) (Ll   Lk)
r (k0)KW (k0) + w (k0)LW (k0)
=
=
1
2
(Ll   Lk)

1
LW (k0)
  1
KW (k0)

> 0; (21)
as Ll > Lk, and LW (k0) < KW (k0) for all k0 2 Jk. (See Appendix A.) Hence,
p (k0) [Bk (k0) Bl (k0)] > 0. This result simply restates the role of endowment
similarity discussed above.
The inequality
p (k00) [Bk (k00) Bl (k00)] > p (k0) [Bk (k0) Bl (k0)] (22)
holds if 1LW (k00)   1KW (k00) > 1LW (k0)   1KW (k0) . A su¢ cient condition for this is
1
4
  2

a2 <
 P
k2Jk k
2
k00k0
: (23)
Two opposite e¤ects are at stake here. A shock to a larger country has a
stronger e¤ect on relative factor prices, leading to a larger di¤erence in the
security purchases by countries k and l. Country k will want to take a larger
position to insure against the negative e¤ect of the shock on its income, whereas
country l will take a smaller position due to the implicit insurance it receives
through the change in relative prices. (We call this the quantity e¤ect.) At
the same time, a shock to a larger country raises world output by more in the
corresponding state of nature, leading to a lower price of the associated security.
(We call this the price e¤ect.) The su¢ cient condition above makes sure that
the quantity e¤ect is stronger than the price e¤ect. Notice that, for given values
of j , a higher  implies a larger quantity e¤ect, as the productivity shock on
the large country will translate into a large e¤ect on relative factor prices. As 
decreases, the highest a compatible with the su¢ cient condition decreases: the
less dissimilar countries k and l, the smaller the quantity e¤ect. This su¢ cient
condition is very weak, as the term on the right-hand side of equation (23) is
larger than one.
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2.4 International Portfolio Choice without Arrow-Debreu
Securities
The model above delivers the key intuitions that explain our empirical nd-
ings: other things equal, countries with more similar (dissimilar) comparative
advantages invest more (less) in one another due to better (worse) insurance
possibilities. However, many of the models assumptions and implications are
at odds with reality. First of all, most real-life assets are not Arrow-Debreu.
Moreover, international consumption correlations are lower than output corre-
lations, which suggests that actual international risk sharing is far from the
complete asset market benchmark. (See Backus et al. [2].) Finally, countries
tend to invest most of their wealth in their own domestic assets. (See French
and Poterba [6].)
In Appendix C, we show that a similar model with a more realistic nancial
side also predicts a positive relationship between comparative advantage simi-
larity and international portfolio choice. Assume investors can buy ownership
claims on countriesGDPs rather than Arrow-Debreu securities. Assume also
that holding foreign assets is subject to frictions. This creates a home bias in
each countrys portfolio, and leads in turn, within the portfolio share that is
invested in foreign assets, to a bias towards assets issued by countries with sim-
ilar comparative advantages. This is due to the fact that the latter provide a
home-biased portfolio with better insurance for the same reasons we discussed
above.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Estimation Issues
We estimate a gravity equation that relates the amount invested by source
country S in host country H to a proxy for relative factor endowment similarity
between countries S and H, and other controls, such as proxies for frictions in
commodity and asset markets, as well as host and source country xed e¤ects.
Consider the following expression:
BSH = Z
Z
SHD
D
SHuSH ; (24)
where BSH denotes country Ss portfolio investment in country H;  denotes
parameters; ZSH stands for a country-pair control; DSH denotes a proxy for
comparative advantage similarity between countries S and H; and uSH denotes
an error term assumed to be statistically independent of the variables on the
right hand side of the equation.9
Apart from using the OLS and Tobit estimators which are commonly em-
ployed in the literature, we also use the Poisson estimator. While gravity equa-
tions are usually log-linearized and estimated by OLS, this practice may be
inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, BSH can be zero, in which case
9We are simply augmenting the gravity equation in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [17] with DSH .
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log-linearization is unfeasible. (This problem is often solved by adding one to
all observations before taking logs.10) Second, as Santos-Silva and Tenreyro
[25] have recently pointed out, under heteroskedasticity, the expected value of
the log-linearized error will in general be correlated with the regressors, and
OLS will therefore be inconsistent. This is because the non-linear transforma-
tion changes the properties of the error term, as the conditional expectation of
lnuSH depends on the shape of the conditional distribution of uSH . Santos-Silva
and Tenreyro [25] propose the following example as an illustration of this prob-
lem: assume uSH is distributed lognormal, with E (uSH j DSH ; ZSH) = 1 and
variance 2SH = f (DSH ; ZSH).
11 lnuSH will thus be distributed normal, with
E (lnuSH j DSH ; ZSH) =   12 ln
 
1 + 2SH

, which is a function of the regressors.
In the face of this problem, it is more appropriate to estimate the gravity
equation in its non-linear form. After assessing the properties of a number
of alternative estimators, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro [25] propose the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (often used for count data) for this task.
This estimator turns out to be consistent under very weak assumptions (mainly
that the model is well specied), and also provides a natural way to deal with
zero values, as no logarithmic transformation is necessary for its implementation.
3.2 Accounting for Country Size
Other things equal, a larger country will have a stronger e¤ect on world prices.
Thus, countries with similar relative endowments should invest more in a large
country than in a small country; and countries with dissimilar comparative
advantages should invest less in the large country than in the small country.
Actually, country similarity should not have a positive e¤ect on a countrys
portfolio at all if the host country cannot a¤ect world prices.
Consider a proxy for country similarity DSH that takes positive values when
countries are similar, and negative values when countries are dissimilar. To
capture the intuition of the paragraph above, we need to interact DSH with a
proxy for the host countrys size. We follow two alternative procedures here.
First, we interact DSH with the host countrys log-GDP, ln(YH). We expect
these interaction coe¢ cients to be positive. Our model predicts that countries
invest more in each other when they are similar in terms of factor endowment
ratios, i.e. DSH > 0. The greater the size of the host country, the greater the
investment, for a given level of similarity. Alternatively, two countries with very
di¤erent factor endowment ratios (DSH < 0) want to invest less in one another
because of the insurance mechanism relative prices provide. The greater the
10The Tobit estimator is also often used in the gravity equation literature when the depen-
dent variable takes zero and positive values. (Again, a one is added to all observations before
taking logs.) However, in the presence of xed e¤ects, the Tobit estimator may be biased due
to the incidental parameters problem.
11The characteristics of the data suggest uSH will be heteroskedastic. Since BSH is non-
negative, when its conditional expectation approaches zero, the probability of BSH being
positive and its conditional variance must also tend to zero. When the conditional expectation
of BSH is large instead, it is possible to observe a greater dispersion, as BSH can now deviate
from its conditional expectation in either direction.
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size of the host country, the more it inuences world relative prices, and the
more insurance it provides to the source country. Therefore, less investment
is required in a host country with dissimilar endowment ratios if it is a large
country. Again, this leads us to expect a positive coe¢ cient. The type of gravity
equation we estimate in this case has got the following form:12
BSH = Z
Z
SHe
DDSHeY ln(YH)eI [DSH ln(YH)]uSH : (25)
Second, we classify host countries into two categories: small(those with GDPs
below the median of the sample) and large(those with GDPs above the median
of the sample). We then consider a separate coe¢ cient onDSH for each category,
and test the null hypothesis of same coe¢ cient for both categories.
3.3 Data13
Our dependent variable BSH is taken from the IMFs Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey (CPIS).14 For each participating country, the CPIS reports
data on foreign portfolio asset holdings by residence of the issuer (bilateral
portfolio equity holdings). These include both equity and debt, but the CPIS
has made an e¤ort to exclude foreign direct investment (FDI) from these data.15
Data have been released for end-1997 (with only 29 source countries), end-
2001 (with 67 source countries), end-2002, end-2003, and end-2004. According
to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [17], for those countries that participated in both
1997 and 2001 and 2002 surveys, there is considerable persistence in bilateral
equity holdings. We focus exclusively on the 2002 edition. Table 1 reports some
information on the countries in our sample.
Our measure of similarity in factor endowment ratio K=L between countries
S and H is based on the following variable:
dSH 
lnKL

S
  ln

K
L

H
 : (26)
The source for aggregate capital-labor ratios is Caselli and Feyrer [3]. Notice
that dSH decreases with the similarity of countries and is always positive. For
the reasons discussed above, we need our proxy for comparative advantage sim-
ilarity (i) to rise with similarity and (ii) to take positive values when countries
S and H are similar enough and negative values when they are dissimilar
enough. For this purpose, we rst compute d0SH = max (dSH)   dSH . Then,
we nally rearrange our variable to DSH = d0SH  med(d0SH), where med(d0SH)
is the sample median of d0SH . We interpret DSH > 0 as the country pair being
12Since DSH takes negative values, we cannot enter it in levels into the gravity equation.
Thus, the estimated elasticity of BSH with respect to DSH is not constant. This is actually
in agreement with our theoretical results in section 2.
13See Appendix D for a detailed description of variables and sources.
14See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [17] for a detailed description of the dataset, as well as a
discussion of its potential shortcomings.
15The CPIS considers an investment as FDI (as opposed to portfolio investment) if the
foreign investor owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power.
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similar in terms of factor endowment ratios. Equivalently, DSH < 0 implies the
two countries have dissimilar ratios.16
We proxy for commodity and asset trade frictions with the volume of trade,
distance, and dummies for country pairs in which countries participate in the
same regional trade agreement, share a border, the same currency, a common
language, a colonial relationship (past or present), and a common legal origin.
The source for these data is Glick and Rose [7], but for the common legal origin
dummy, which is taken from La Porta et al. [14].
We also use as controls the correlation of real GDP growth rates (which
proxies for the correlation of productivity shocks); a proxy for the similarity in
GDP per capita (constructed in a manner similar to DSH); and a variable that
controls for countries being in di¤erent time zones to proxy for informational
similarities. As in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [17] we also include two nancial
variables: the rst is the correlation in stock market returns, since it may inu-
ence asset holdings in an incomplete-markets environment. The second one is
the correlation between host-country stock market returns and source-country
GDP growth, to control for the fact that the host-country stock market can
work as a hedge against source-country output uctuations.
Finally, we use a proxy for similarity in the production structures of coun-
tries. For any pair of countries j, j0, this variable is constructed as
Ejj0 = 2 
X
i
(sij   sij0)2 ; (27)
where sij denotes country js export share17 of good i to the world. Ejj0 is
always positive and grows with the similarity of the production structures of
countries. Data on manufacturing exports are obtained from the World Trade
Flows Database (see Feenstra et al. [5]).
4 Results
Tables 2 to 7 report our estimation results. Tables 2-3 report results for the
full sample of countries, Tables 4-5 report results when we limit host countries
to OECD membership, and Tables 6-7 present results for the sample of High
Income and Upper Middle Income countries based on the World Bank classi-
cation for 2002.18
In each table we present 15 columns. Columns (1) to (5) correspond to our
main specication, in which we include the standard gravity equation con-
trols together with the log of bilateral trade, the GDP growth correlations,
16Normalising DSH by the mean rather than the median leads to very similar results.
17We use exports by country-industry rather than production, because the former is avail-
able at ne levels of disaggregation for many more countries than the latter. The correlation
between "similarity in exports" and "similarity in K/L ratio" is around 0.16.
18To control for outliers, in all regressions we eliminate single observations that account for
more than 30% of the total equity invested or received by a country. This reduces the sample
by around 1%.
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and similarity in the production structure. Column (1) corresponds to the
Tobit estimation, columns (2)-(3) to the OLS estimation without and with ze-
roes, respectively; nally, columns (4)-(5) corresponds to the Poisson estimation
without and with zeroes, respectively.
Columns (6) to (10) redo the same process after including the two nancial
variables that may inuence asset holdings in an incomplete nancial market
scenario. Apart from the correlation in stock returns, we also include the cor-
relation between host country stock market returns and source country GDP
growth. This variable is supposed to take into account the role of the host
country stock market in potentially hedging against source country output uc-
tuations. In all cases, correlations are calculated using historical data between
1980 and 1996. In the same way as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, we are condent
that the endogeneity of nancial correlations to the size of bilateral nancial
holdings is not a major concern, since most foreign equity investment took
place since the mid-1990s.
Finally, columns (11) to (15) repeat the same procedure after including two
additional variables that are supposed to proxy for informational frictions: the
di¤erence in time zone across countries and the similarity in the log of GDP per
capita.
Across the tables we observe that the controls that seem to be most signif-
icant in explaining bilateral nancial asset holdings are: (i) bilateral trade, as
was already suggested by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [17]; (ii) correlation in GDP
growth; (iii) common language; (iv) currency area.
4.1 Full Sample
In Table 2 (also Tables 4 and 6) we interact our similarity in capital-labour
ratio with ln(GDP ). In Table 3 (also Tables 5 and 7) we divide the sample in
two parts based on the host countrys GDP level and allow each subsample to
have its own coe¢ cient. Therefore, no interaction terms are included in these
regressions. We always test the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients for the two
subsamples.
In Table 2 we nd that our interaction term is positive and signicantly
di¤erent from zero at the 1% level in all 15 specications. But since the coef-
cient on the similarity of capital-labor ratio is rather negative and also very
signicant, we cannot conclude yet that the nal coe¢ cient is actually positive,
as our theory predicts. The value of the combined coe¢ cient, hereafter CC, will
depend on the host country GDP size, and is determined in the following way:
CC = coef [simKL] + ln (GDP )  coef [simKL  ln (GDP )];
where coef [simKL] denotes the coe¢ cient corresponding to endowment simi-
larity, and coef [simKL ln (GDP )] denotes the coe¢ cient corresponding to the
interaction between endowment similarity and host-country size.
This combined coe¢ cient becomes positive well before the mean and median
of ln(GDP ) in our sample, which are 26.8 and 26.6, respectively. For example, in
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column (1) the coe¢ cient becomes positive for values of ln (GDP ) above 25.92.19
Additionally, this combined coe¢ cient is positive and signicantly di¤erent from
zero at the 5% level at levels of ln (GDP ) around the median, even though for the
Poisson estimations the value is usually somewhat higher.20 The interpretation
is that while the combined coe¢ cient is positive for almost all the sample of
host GDP countries, only the countries with a relatively large size (i.e. above
the median of GDP) a¤ect world prices, in turn having a coe¢ cient that is
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Let us now address the economic signicance of our results. Based on Table
2, we focus rst on the e¤ect of host-country size on equity positions, which
is captured by our interaction term:21 a 1% increase in the host countrys
GDP leads to a reduction in the equity position towards this country of 0.25%
when the value of the factor endowment similarity index is -0.68, i.e. at the
25th percentile of our similarity index. Similarly, it leads to an increase in
the equity position of 0.1% under a value of the factor endowment similarity
index of 0.26, i.e. at the 75th percentile of our similarity index.22 Regarding
country similarity, an increase in the index of factor endowment similarity by
0.1 leads to an increase in equity positions towards the host country by 0.08%
when the latter is of middle size (ln (GDP ) = 25) and by 0.15% when it is large
(ln (GDP ) = 27).
In Table 3, the coe¢ cient of the large host countries is positive and, in
general, signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level, while the coe¢ cient for
the small host countries is never signicant. Additionally, we test for equality
of coe¢ cients and always reject the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients between
subsamples.23
4.2 Robustness Checks
4.2.1 OECD Membership
In Tables 4-5 we do exactly the same procedure as in Tables 2-3, but by limit-
ing the host countries to be OECD members. This implies eliminating South
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Israel, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand from the sample of host countries. Throughout the tables and
specications, the main message is the same as for the full sample regressions:
similarity in capital-labor ratios matters for equity holdings in the way pro-
posed by our theoretical framework, and this e¤ect becomes stronger as the size
of the host country increases. Additionally, the values of the coe¢ cients that
19See "GDP positive interaction threshold" at the bottom of the table.
20See "GDP 5% signicance threshold" at the bottom of the table.
21Another size e¤ect is captured by the host-country xed e¤ect, and goes back to the
original gravity equation intuition: an increase in host-country GDP leads to a proportional
increase in equity positions allocated to that country.
22Regarding the factor endowment similarity index, by construction, the median takes the
value of 0, its 25th percentile is -0.68, while its 75th percentile is 0.26. Finally, the mean of
our index variable is -0.26 with a standard deviation of 0.61.
23See "H0: coef[KL_small]=coef[KL_large]" at the bottom of the table.
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we obtain are similar to the ones we obtained with the full sample.
4.2.2 World Bank Income Classication
In Tables 6-7 we redo the exercise by looking at relatively rich source and host
countries. The World Bank classication for the year 2000 divides countries into
four categories: (1) High Income; (2) Upper Middle Income; (3) Lower Middle
Income; (4) Low Income. We restrict our attention to countries included in
categories (1) and (2).24 Also for this sample do we nd that the previous story
holds. Again, the values of the coe¢ cients are very similar to the ones we obtain
with the previous samples.
5 Concluding Remarks
Recent explanations of the international portfolio positions of countries are
based on commodity and asset trade frictions: a country invests more in coun-
tries with which goods and assets are traded more freely. This paper comple-
ments these theories by pointing out that international portfolio decisions are
also inuenced by the similarity in the capital-labor ratios of countries. In par-
ticular, countries with similar capital-labor ratios have a stronger incentive to
invest in one another for insurance purposes due to the e¤ect of countries on
prices when they su¤er a shock. This e¤ect obviously depends on the host coun-
trys size. We conrm our hypothesis with di¤erent econometric specications
and data samples. Future work should try to elucidate whether and how other
sources of comparative advantage also a¤ect the international portfolio decisions
of countries.
24We eliminate Colombia, Peru, Indonesia, and Thailand.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
6.1 The Role of Endowment Similarity
Assume j = 1 for all j 2 J .
6.1.1 Proof 1: Yk (l) > Yk (k0)
Since r (l) = w (k0) > r (k0) = w (l),
Yk (l) =

1
2
+ 

r (l) +

1
2
  

w (l) >
>

1
2
+ 

r (k0) +

1
2
  

w (k0) = Yk (k0) :
Tedious algebra yields
Yk (l)  Yk (k0) = 2a
YW
2: (28)
6.1.2 Proof 2: 1J YW > Yk (l)
Since we have factor price equalization (à la Treer [27]), we can nd YW from
the integrated equilibrium:
YW = YW (l) = [y1W (l)]
1
2 [y2W (l)]
1
2 =
=

J
2
Kk +
J
2
Kl + aKl
 1
2

J
2
Lk +
J
2
Ll + aLl
 1
2
:
Concerning Yk (l),
Yk (l) = r (l)Kk + w (l)Lk =
1
2

y2W (l)
y1W (l)
 1
2
Kk +
1
2

y1W (l)
y2W (l)
 1
2
Lk =
=
1
2
24 J2Lk + J2Ll + aLl
J
2Kk +
J
2Kl + aKl
! 1
2
Kk +
 
J
2Kk +
J
2Kl + aKl
J
2Lk +
J
2Ll + aLl
! 1
2
Lk
35 :
Tedious algebra yields
YW   JYk (l) = Y  1W
 
a2 + Ja

LkLl = Y
 1
W
 
a2 + Ja
1
4
  2

> 0: (29)
6.1.3 Proof 3: Yk (k) > 1J YW
Recall 1J YW =
1
J
P
j Yj (s) =
1
J
P
s Yj (s). Since
1
J YW > Yk (l) > Yk (k
0), it
follows that Yk (k) > 1J YW .
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6.1.4 Proof 4: Bk (k0) ; Bl (k0) ; Bk0 (k0)
From (2)-(5), (19), and (29),
Bk (l) = Bl (k
0) = Y  1W

a2
J
+ a

1
4
  2

> 0: (30)
As for Bk (k0), from (19), (28), and (30),
Bk (k
0) = Y  1W

a2
J
+ a

1
4
  2

+ 2a2

> 0: (31)
Asset market clearing and equations (30) and (31) yield
Bk0 (k
0) =  Y  1W

a2
J
+ a

1
4
  2

(J   1) + 2a2

J
2
  1

< 0:
6.2 The Role of Size
We allow for cross-country di¤erences in size. We assume that the distributions
of the scaling factor j within Jk and Jl are symmetric.
6.2.1 Proof 5: LW (k0) < KW (k0)
KW (k
0) =
X
k2Jk
k

1
2
+ 

+
X
l2Jl
l

1
2
  

+ k0a

1
2
+ 

=
=
X
k2Jk
k + k0a

1
2
+ 

; (32)
LW (k
0) =
X
k2Jk
k

1
2
  

+
X
l2Jl
l

1
2
+ 

+ k0a

1
2
  

=
X
k2Jk
k + k0a

1
2
  

< KW (k
0) : (33)
6.2.2 Proof 6: Su¢ cient Condition for p (k00) [Bk (k00) Bl (k00)] > p (k0) [Bk (k0) Bl (k0)]
KW (k
00) KW (k0) = (k00   k0) a

1
2
+ 

> 0; (34)
LW (k
00)  LW (k0) = (k00   k0) a

1
2
  

> 0: (35)
Notice p (k00) [Bk (k00) Bl (k00)]  p (k0) [Bk (k0) Bl (k0)] > 0 if
1
LW (k00)
  1
KW (k00)

 

1
LW (k0)
  1
KW (k0)

=
=

KW (k
00) KW (k0)
KW (k00)KW (k0)

 

LW (k
00)  LW (k0)
LW (k00)LW (k0)

> 0; (36)
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which is equivalent to
1
2 + 
1
2   
>
P
k2Jk k + k00a
 
1
2 + 
 P
k2Jk k + k0a
 
1
2 + 
P
k2Jk k + k00a
 
1
2   
 P
k2Jk k + k0a
 
1
2   
 : (37)
A su¢ cient condition for this inequality to hold is
a2 <
 P
k2Jk k
2
k00k0
 
1
4   2
 : (38)
7 Appendix B: A Many-Good Model
This appendix discusses a many-good generalization of the model in section 2.
Our purpose here is to show that the models key feature driving international
portfolio choice is relative factor endowment similarity. In the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, production structures are undened in the presence of more goods than
factors. Therefore factor endowment similarity does not necessarily imply sim-
ilar production structures. On the other hand, a country will still be interested
in investing a larger share of its international portfolio in countries with similar
factor endowments for insurance purposes.
We maintain most of the models assumptions, but for the ones we mention
here:
1. The nal good C is now dened over a continuum of goods, which are
aggregated in a Cobb-Douglas fashion:
Cj = exp
Z 1
0
lnCj (z) dz

; (39)
where C (z) denotes consumption of freely traded intermediate good z,
z 2 [0; 1].
2. Each industry employs the two production factors, K and L, which are
freely mobile between industries. Production functions are also of the
Cobb-Douglas type:
yj (z) = [AjKj (z)]
(z)
[AjLj (z)]
1 (z)
;
where yj (z) denotes production of good z in country j; and  (z) 2 [0; 1].
For simplicity, we assume  (z) = z.25
3. There is an upper limit  < 1=2 to the di¤erences in relative factor en-
dowments we can allow for, as we focus (for simplicity) on the factor price
equalization case.
4. We assume equal size for all countries: j = 1 for all j 2 J .
25Any symmetric distribution of  (z) such that  (z) = 1    (1  z) would yield similar
results.
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7.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
We again assume factor price equalization à la Treer [27]. We will therefore
nd equilibrium prices by solving for the integrated equilibrium; i.e., we assume
both commodities and factors are freely mobile in the world, as if the latter
were a single (closed) economy.
The integrated equilibrium conditions are the following:
 Pricing:
p (z) = b (z; r; w) ; (40)
b (z; r; w) =

r
 (z)
(z) 
w
1   (z)
1 (z)
; (41)
P = exp
Z 1
0
ln p (z) dz

; (42)
where b (z; r; w) denotes industry zs cost function; r and w are, respec-
tively, the prices of capital and labor in e¢ ciency units; and P denotes
the price of the nal good, which we will use as numeraire: P = 1.
 Commodity market clearing:
CW (z) =
PCW
p (z)
= yW (z) ; (43)
CW = YW = rKW + wLW ;
where KW 
P
j2J AjKj and LW 
P
j2J AjLj .
 Factor market clearing:Z 1
0
@b (z; r; w)
@r
yW (z) dz = KW ; (44)Z 1
0
@b (z; r; w)
@w
yW (z) dz = LW : (45)
Putting conditions (40), (41), (43), (44), and (45) together, w=r = KW =LW ,
and P = e 
1
2 r
1
2w
1
2 . These last two equations and the choice of numeraire yield
r = e 
1
2 (KW =LW )
  12 and w = e 
1
2 (KW =LW )
1
2 . It is easy to show that the
results we discussed in section 2.1 also hold here. Dening country js gross
domestic product as Yj = r (AjKj) + w (AjLj), we obtain Yk (k) > 1J YW >
Yk (l) > Yk (k
0). The models symmetry implies Yk0 (k0) > 1J YW > Yl (k
0) >
Yk (k
0).
7.2 Asset Market Equilibrium
The following results are the counterpart to results 1, 2 and 4 in section 2.3:
22
1. Assume  > 0. Consider state of nature k0, k0 2 Jk: Bk (k0) > Bl (k0) >
0 > Bk0 (k
0). By symmetry, Bk (k0) > Bk (l) > 0 > Bk (k).
2. When factor endowment ratio di¤erences are small, countries k and l do
not di¤er in their investment decisions regarding country k0:
lim
!0
[Bk (k
0) Bl (k0)] = 0:
3. Regarding ,  =   22
( aJ+1)(
1
4 2)
, d jj =d > 0.
8 Appendix C: International Portfolio Choice
without Arrow-Debreu Securities
This appendix discusses a model without Arrow-Debreu securities that yields
results comparable to those we obtained in section 2. We assume the same setup
as in section 2 on the goods side (including our assumptions on productivity
shocks and states of nature), but consider a completely di¤erent asset side.
1. Let us simplify by assuming J = 4, j = 1 for all j 2 J , and complete
specialization ( = 1=2).
2. We assume quadratic utility
U (Cj) = Cj   b
2
C2j ; (46)
where b > 0.26
3. Before uncertainty is realized countries can only exchange ownership claims
on their GDPs.
4. International asset trade is costly: a fraction  jj0 =  2 (0; 1) of the payo¤
that country j receives from its claims on country-j0GDP, j0 6= j, is wasted
as a cost of keeping foreign assets in country js portfolio ( jj = 0 for all
j).27
Let Vj be the market value of country js uncertain GDP Yj  pjyj . The
problems budget constraints can be written as follows:
Vj =
JX
j0=1
xjj0Vj0 ; (47)
Cj =
JX
j0=1
xjj0 (1   jj0)Yj0 ; (48)
26 b must be small enough so that U 0 (C) > 0.
27This is the classical icebergassumption due to Samuelson [24], which has been used in
international nance by Martin and Rey [19], [20].
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where xjj0 denotes country js share of ownership claims on country-j0 income.28
Asset market clearing requires
PJ
j=1 xjj0 = 1 for all j
0 2 J . Country js utility
maximization problem can be expressed as:
max
fxjj0gJj0=1
E
24U
24 JX
j0=1
xjj0 (1   jj0)Yj0
3535 ; (49)
subject to Vj = j0xjj0Vj0 . The rst-order conditions with respect to xjj0 ,
j0 = 1; :::; J , yield
jVj0
1   jj0 = E [U
0 (Cj)Yj0 ] = cov [U 0 (Cj) ; Yj0 ] + E [U 0 (Cj)]E (Yj0) ; (50)
j0 2 J , and where j is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint.
Due to the models symmetry, j = , E (Yj) = E (Y ), and Vj = V for all j. The
presence of international asset market frictions thus implies cov [U 0 (Cj) ; Yj ] <
cov [U 0 (Cj) ; Yj0 ] for all j0 6= j. With quadratic utility, this is equivalent to
cov [Cj ; Yj ] > cov [Cj ; Yj0 ]. Thus, portfolios will be home-biased due to the
presence of frictions.
We now show xkk0 > xkl. Consider rst k; k0 2 Jk: since cov [Ck; Yk] >
cov [Ck; Yk0 ] and var (Yk) = var (Yk0),
[xkk   xkk0 (1  )] var (Yk) > [xkk   xkk0 (1  )] cov (Yk; Yk0) : (51)
Since cov (Yk; Yk0) < 0,29 xkk > xkk0 (1  ). Consider now k; k0 2 Jk and
l; l0 2 Jl: since, from the rst-order condition (50), cov [Ck; Yk0 ] = cov [Ck; Yl],
xkk0 (1  ) var (Yk0)+xkkcov (Yk; Yk0) = xkl (1  ) var (Yl)+xkl0 (1  ) cov (Yl; Yl0) :
(52)
By symmetry, var (Yk0) = var (Yl) > 0, cov (Yj ; Yk) = cov (Yl; Yl0) < 0, and
xkl = xkl0 . Solving for xkl (1  ),
xkl (1  ) = xkk
0 (1  ) var (Yk0) + xkkcov (Yk; Yk0)
var (Yk0) + cov (Yk; Yk0)
<
<
xkk0 (1  ) [var (Yk0) + cov (Yk; Yk0)]
var (Yk0) + cov (Yk; Yk0)
= xkk0 (1  ) ; (53)
since xkk > xkk0 (1  ) and cov (Yk; Yk0) < 0. Hence, xkk0 > xkl: country k
invests a larger share of its wealth in country k0 than in country l.30
This setup is correctly spelt out only for the case xkk > xkk0 > xkl  0.
How can we make sure that we have no shortselling in equilibrium? Notice that
28Country js total consumptionof the nal good (that is, inclusive of the resources wasted
in keeping its international portfolio) is
PJ
j0=1 xjj0Yj0 .
29Under complete specialization, it is easy to prove that cov(Yk; Yk0 ) < cov (Yk; Yl) = 0.
30According to our computer simulations, allowing for CRRA utility and a higher elasticity
of substitution between goods, as well as for a less restrictive distribution of states of nature,
yields similar results. These results are available upon request.
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in the absence of asset trade frictions ( = 0), countries would be able to insure
fully by choosing xkk = xkk0 = xkl = 1=4. We can show that xkl is a continuous
function of  . Hence, by continuity, for a small positive  , xkl > 0. (In any
case, we do not observe shortselling in the data.)
9 Appendix D: Sources and Denitions of Vari-
ables
- Bilateral portfolio equity holdings (in millions of US dollars): Portfolio eq-
uity instruments issued by host country residents and held by source country
residents. Source: 2002 Coordinated Portfolio Survey (IMF). Year: 2002.
- GDP (in millions of year-2000 US dollars). Source: Penn-World Tables.
Year: 2001.
- Total population. Source: World Development Indicators. Year: 2001.
- Log of bilateral trade. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
- Distance: Logarithm of great circle distance in miles between the capital
cities of source and host countries. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
- Common border: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host
countries share a border. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
- Regional trade agreement (RTA): Dummy variable taking the value of 1
if source and host countries share the same regional trade agreement. Source:
Glick and Rose [7].
- Currency area: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host
countries are in the same (strict) currency union. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
(Updated for the euro area by the authors.)
- Colony/Colonizer: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host
countries ever had a colonial relationship. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
- Common language: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and
host countries share a common language. Source: Glick and Rose [7].
- Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and
host countries have a legal system with a common origin (common law, French,
German, or Scandinavian). Source: La Porta et al. [14].
- Correlation in GDP growth rates: Correlation between the real GDP
growth rate in the source and host country. Authorsown computations based
on real GDP growth rates. Source: World Development Indicators. Period:
1981-2000.
- Correlation of stock returns. Period 1980-96. Source: Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti [17]
- Correlation of growth-stock returns. Period 1980-96. Source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti [17]
- Capital-labor ratios. Source: Caselli and Feyrer [3]. Year: 2000.
- Time di¤erence. Authors calculation. The variable is constructed as
ln(0:001 + time_difference).
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- Exports by sector to the world at the 2-digit level. Source: Feenstra (NBER
database). We only include countries that have at most 4 missing sectoral values.
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Table 1. Information on countries in the sample
Countries ln(GDP) Total source equity Total host equity
Mexico 27.42 - 32179
Peru 25.46 - 830
United States 29.91 1211995 883255
United Kingdom 28.02 454824 617163
Italy 27.91 236145 111258
Netherlands 26.78 209553 234769
Canada 27.45 196270 94029
France 28.04 191511 286155
Japan 28.75 187926 300688
Ireland 25.34 134574 104392
Belgium 26.27 104597 33493
Sweden 26.14 93698 51921
Australia 26.96 62581 71793
Spain 27.44 52846 97670
Norway 25.75 52033 15965
South Africa 26.61 32075 18261
Austria 26.12 28606 6731
Finland 25.5 21551 80365
Portugal 25.92 7705 10694
New Zealand 25.11 7548 4272
Argentina 26.72 6760 1374
Chile 25.91 4466 2900
Greece 25.8 2548 5032
Israel 25.58 1734 12639
Brazil 27.87 1184 21496
Korea 27.36 1156 58973
Malaysia 26.25 1046 11893
Colombia 26.22 402 190
Indonesia 27.49 63 7544
Thailand 26.76 52 8355
Turkey 26.62 40 6342
"ln(GDP0)" is the log of real GDP of 2001 in units of US$ 2000. 
"Total source equity" and "Total host equity" are both measured in millions of US$ 2002.
Table 2. Full Sample. Interaction term: ln(GDP) with host countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.600 0.365 0.382 0.137 0.150 0.602 0.373 0.354 0.143 0.154 0.608 0.349 0.347 0.170 0.180
[0.118]*** [0.134]** [0.155]** [0.130] [0.130] [0.123]*** [0.148]** [0.168]** [0.130] [0.129] [0.124]*** [0.151]** [0.175]* [0.126] [0.126]
Log of distance -0.172 -0.341 -0.215 -0.042 -0.034 -0.146 -0.317 -0.193 -0.025 -0.021 -0.136 -0.289 -0.171 -0.039 -0.035
[0.159] [0.143]** [0.150] [0.119] [0.119] [0.164] [0.144]** [0.156] [0.118] [0.118] [0.170] [0.135]** [0.149] [0.113] [0.113]
Common legal origin 0.269 0.293 0.251 -0.071 -0.075 0.287 0.316 0.273 -0.077 -0.079 0.293 0.318 0.280 0.025 0.023
[0.145]* [0.158]* [0.130]* [0.157] [0.158] [0.148]* [0.175]* [0.137]* [0.160] [0.161] [0.149]** [0.179]* [0.137]** [0.149] [0.149]
Dummy for common border 0.270 0.190 0.175 0.435 0.433 0.234 0.159 0.108 0.431 0.428 0.211 0.216 0.116 0.460 0.450
[0.289] [0.293] [0.309] [0.131]*** [0.133]*** [0.292] [0.288] [0.299] [0.136]*** [0.138]*** [0.293] [0.286] [0.290] [0.138]*** [0.141]***
Dummy for common language 0.251 0.080 0.174 0.492 0.494 0.214 0.064 0.127 0.475 0.478 0.203 0.117 0.156 0.437 0.438
[0.218] [0.201] [0.213] [0.178]*** [0.177]*** [0.224] [0.211] [0.233] [0.181]*** [0.180]*** [0.229] [0.214] [0.209] [0.165]*** [0.163]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.324 0.458 0.477 -0.232 -0.236 0.356 0.474 0.493 -0.221 -0.225 0.354 0.430 0.457 -0.172 -0.181
[0.288] [0.354] [0.346] [0.201] [0.200] [0.297] [0.361] [0.353] [0.205] [0.204] [0.303] [0.355] [0.337] [0.203] [0.201]
Dummy. Strict currency area -0.057 -0.134 -0.108 0.988 0.991 -0.108 -0.120 -0.073 0.994 0.994 -0.140 -0.021 -0.045 0.996 0.996
[0.270] [0.315] [0.328] [0.249]*** [0.249]*** [0.277] [0.314] [0.320] [0.246]*** [0.246]*** [0.281] [0.325] [0.332] [0.250]*** [0.249]***
Dummy. Regional trade agreement -0.262 -0.304 -0.060 0.186 0.175 -0.373 -0.346 -0.123 0.199 0.186 -0.390 -0.332 -0.127 0.226 0.217
[0.290] [0.331] [0.330] [0.131] [0.127] [0.300] [0.323] [0.327] [0.137] [0.132] [0.301] [0.326] [0.329] [0.148] [0.142]
GDP growth correlations 0.696 0.637 0.776 -0.217 -0.209 0.708 0.647 0.703 -0.250 -0.241 0.736 0.575 0.687 -0.317 -0.299
[0.239]*** [0.328]* [0.295]** [0.193] [0.192] [0.245]*** [0.330]* [0.286]** [0.229] [0.228] [0.248]*** [0.324]* [0.280]** [0.242] [0.244]
Similarity in K/L ratio -8.477 -8.709 -8.633 -7.737 -7.465 -7.995 -7.706 -7.648 -7.704 -7.443 -7.728 -8.286 -7.848 -7.356 -7.203
[2.538]*** [3.132]*** [2.338]*** [2.470]*** [2.493]*** [2.586]*** [3.200]** [2.130]*** [2.491]*** [2.513]*** [2.608]*** [3.164]** [2.177]*** [2.551]*** [2.572]***
Similarity in K/L ratio *log(GDP) 0.327 0.355 0.348 0.295 0.285 0.309 0.319 0.310 0.294 0.284 0.307 0.322 0.312 0.286 0.281
[0.093]*** [0.118]*** [0.089]*** [0.084]*** [0.086]*** [0.095]*** [0.119]** [0.081]*** [0.085]*** [0.087]*** [0.095]*** [0.114]*** [0.082]*** [0.091]*** [0.093]***
Similarity in exports 5.742 13.098 2.850 -6.591 -6.434 -0.414 10.483 -1.635 -7.262 -7.268 0.780 6.542 -2.410 -4.892 -3.391
[18.314] [13.376] [16.505] [9.114] [8.876] [18.941] [15.758] [17.253] [8.589] [8.367] [19.013] [16.507] [17.183] [9.828] [9.623]
Similarity in exports*log(GDP) -0.288 -0.494 -0.182 0.206 0.196 -0.070 -0.386 -0.017 0.227 0.223 -0.116 -0.237 0.018 0.137 0.077
[0.678] [0.495] [0.614] [0.296] [0.285] [0.700] [0.582] [0.640] [0.277] [0.266] [0.703] [0.612] [0.637] [0.330] [0.322]
Correlation stock returns 0.723 0.219 1.139 0.257 0.239 0.787 0.057 1.094 0.268 0.292
[0.576] [0.481] [0.457]** [0.328] [0.330] [0.583] [0.538] [0.416]** [0.361] [0.358]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.368 0.020 -0.044 -0.025 -0.047 -0.359 -0.011 -0.053 -0.029 -0.050
[0.204]* [0.310] [0.208] [0.221] [0.222] [0.205]* [0.327] [0.209] [0.219] [0.219]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.296 0.715 0.184 -0.177 -0.323
[0.370] [0.515] [0.480] [0.581] [0.557]
Time difference -0.012 -0.000 -0.011 0.035 0.035
[0.025] [0.026] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024]
Observations 650 523 650 523 650 624 501 624 501 624 624 501 624 501 624
GDP positive interaction threshold: 25.92 24.53 24.81 26.23 26.19 25.87 24.16 24.67 26.20 26.21 25.17 25.73 25.15 25.72 25.63
GDP 5% significance threshold: 26.74 26.28 26.08 27.84 27.79 26.79 26.19 25.98 27.84 27.79 26.93 28.00 27.18 27.56 27.52
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
Table 3. Full Sample. Interaction term: sample split in two parts based on host GDP size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.573 0.340 0.354 0.181 0.192 0.578 0.348 0.333 0.188 0.198 0.587 0.325 0.328 0.207 0.212
[0.118]*** [0.136]** [0.151]** [0.121] [0.121] [0.123]*** [0.149]** [0.165]* [0.118] [0.119]* [0.124]*** [0.152]** [0.173]* [0.120]* [0.120]*
Log of distance -0.199 -0.355 -0.252 0.006 0.011 -0.172 -0.332 -0.227 0.026 0.027 -0.170 -0.313 -0.215 0.008 0.009
[0.160] [0.144]** [0.147]* [0.110] [0.111] [0.164] [0.147]** [0.154] [0.109] [0.109] [0.171] [0.139]** [0.148] [0.106] [0.106]
Common legal origin 0.278 0.304 0.253 -0.121 -0.125 0.293 0.326 0.276 -0.126 -0.129 0.295 0.326 0.280 -0.018 -0.021
[0.145]* [0.160]* [0.132]* [0.156] [0.157] [0.149]** [0.177]* [0.138]* [0.158] [0.159] [0.149]** [0.181]* [0.138]* [0.147] [0.146]
Dummy for common border 0.240 0.152 0.127 0.397 0.397 0.204 0.123 0.069 0.386 0.383 0.181 0.180 0.076 0.425 0.417
[0.290] [0.293] [0.306] [0.130]*** [0.132]*** [0.293] [0.288] [0.296] [0.134]*** [0.136]*** [0.294] [0.286] [0.290] [0.134]*** [0.137]***
Dummy for common language 0.245 0.062 0.188 0.502 0.505 0.217 0.053 0.146 0.479 0.483 0.198 0.100 0.166 0.441 0.446
[0.219] [0.208] [0.207] [0.178]*** [0.177]*** [0.225] [0.217] [0.229] [0.179]*** [0.178]*** [0.230] [0.218] [0.206] [0.165]*** [0.163]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.339 0.472 0.486 -0.171 -0.175 0.369 0.485 0.503 -0.153 -0.157 0.379 0.448 0.480 -0.101 -0.111
[0.289] [0.354] [0.336] [0.207] [0.206] [0.298] [0.362] [0.344] [0.210] [0.209] [0.304] [0.356] [0.331] [0.206] [0.204]
Dummy. Strict currency area -0.077 -0.158 -0.127 0.985 0.989 -0.130 -0.140 -0.096 0.991 0.992 -0.166 -0.045 -0.076 0.994 0.995
[0.271] [0.314] [0.327] [0.243]*** [0.243]*** [0.277] [0.316] [0.319] [0.240]*** [0.240]*** [0.281] [0.328] [0.329] [0.244]*** [0.244]***
Dummy for regional trade agreement -0.266 -0.316 -0.064 0.223 0.214 -0.372 -0.354 -0.121 0.237 0.225 -0.386 -0.339 -0.123 0.285 0.285
[0.291] [0.327] [0.329] [0.107]** [0.105]** [0.302] [0.319] [0.326] [0.115]** [0.113]** [0.302] [0.323] [0.328] [0.142]** [0.133]**
GDP growth correlations 0.687 0.652 0.759 -0.256 -0.246 0.706 0.663 0.696 -0.315 -0.304 0.735 0.594 0.684 -0.385 -0.359
[0.240]*** [0.332]* [0.296]** [0.177] [0.176] [0.246]*** [0.335]* [0.288]** [0.209] [0.209] [0.248]*** [0.330]* [0.285]** [0.224]* [0.228]
Similarity in K/L ratio (Small countries) -0.079 0.553 0.302 -0.538 -0.525 -0.038 0.651 0.357 -0.561 -0.550 0.215 0.134 0.236 -0.465 -0.437
[0.219] [0.410] [0.248] [0.442] [0.437] [0.225] [0.443] [0.241] [0.431] [0.426] [0.368] [0.434] [0.338] [0.409] [0.399]
Similarity in K/L ratio (Large countries) 0.646 1.199 1.050 0.741 0.723 0.611 1.189 0.988 0.741 0.723 0.855 0.684 0.866 0.875 0.875
[0.178]*** [0.385]*** [0.297]*** [0.283]*** [0.268]*** [0.182]*** [0.385]*** [0.280]*** [0.281]*** [0.266]*** [0.342]** [0.400]* [0.383]** [0.322]*** [0.323]***
Similarity in exports (Small countries) -1.562 0.129 -1.810 -0.979 -1.079 -2.168 0.312 -2.063 -1.195 -1.311 -2.235 0.297 -1.970 -1.140 -1.272
[2.226] [1.876] [2.410] [2.141] [2.115] [2.292] [2.017] [2.633] [2.141] [2.118] [2.296] [1.983] [2.557] [2.051] [2.012]
Similarity in exports (Large countries) -1.609 -0.108 -1.095 0.818 0.681 -1.516 0.363 -0.971 0.698 0.560 -1.635 0.484 -0.859 0.396 0.202
[2.298] [2.228] [2.682] [2.122] [2.081] [2.329] [2.375] [2.900] [2.105] [2.068] [2.340] [2.375] [2.857] [1.948] [1.907]
Correlation stock returns 0.632 0.177 0.990 0.379 0.359 0.705 0.011 0.955 0.389 0.408
[0.578] [0.495] [0.475]** [0.302] [0.304] [0.585] [0.557] [0.436]** [0.354] [0.347]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.362 0.036 -0.041 -0.093 -0.115 -0.352 0.006 -0.047 -0.102 -0.125
[0.206]* [0.315] [0.206] [0.203] [0.204] [0.206]* [0.332] [0.207] [0.200] [0.201]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.314 0.704 0.150 -0.162 -0.286
[0.369] [0.505] [0.466] [0.472] [0.456]
Time difference -0.007 0.004 -0.005 0.037 0.036
[0.025] [0.026] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024]
Observations 650 523 650 523 650 624 501 624 501 624 624 501 624 501 624
H0: coef[KL_small]=coef[KL_large]: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
Table 4. Source countries: Full sample. Host countries: OECD sample. Interaction term: ln(GDP) with host countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.321 0.155 0.164 0.099 0.110 0.307 0.152 0.125 0.106 0.115 0.325 0.141 0.125 0.137 0.145
[0.139]** [0.180] [0.212] [0.145] [0.145] [0.141]** [0.178] [0.210] [0.141] [0.140] [0.141]** [0.176] [0.210] [0.138] [0.137]
Log of distance -0.261 -0.404 -0.351 -0.062 -0.059 -0.284 -0.410 -0.357 -0.032 -0.034 -0.348 -0.451 -0.420 -0.040 -0.040
[0.179] [0.208]* [0.229] [0.132] [0.132] [0.182] [0.206]* [0.227] [0.135] [0.134] [0.193]* [0.197]** [0.213]* [0.126] [0.125]
Common legal origin 0.474 0.492 0.457 -0.093 -0.098 0.517 0.525 0.493 -0.099 -0.100 0.519 0.517 0.482 0.008 0.007
[0.167]*** [0.179]** [0.133]*** [0.168] [0.169] [0.169]*** [0.175]*** [0.130]*** [0.171] [0.172] [0.169]*** [0.173]*** [0.127]*** [0.167] [0.167]
Dummy for common border 0.125 0.181 0.271 0.471 0.465 0.107 0.166 0.257 0.472 0.463 0.041 0.177 0.243 0.484 0.474
[0.317] [0.329] [0.331] [0.133]*** [0.133]*** [0.318] [0.334] [0.321] [0.139]*** [0.140]*** [0.320] [0.342] [0.333] [0.144]*** [0.145]***
Dummy for common language 0.375 0.094 0.209 0.520 0.523 0.419 0.142 0.207 0.498 0.502 0.361 0.140 0.194 0.459 0.461
[0.249] [0.229] [0.256] [0.190]*** [0.188]*** [0.253]* [0.245] [0.269] [0.192]*** [0.191]*** [0.256] [0.242] [0.251] [0.174]*** [0.172]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.071 0.379 0.230 -0.228 -0.236 0.130 0.404 0.263 -0.215 -0.223 0.227 0.449 0.332 -0.170 -0.181
[0.324] [0.360] [0.332] [0.207] [0.207] [0.330] [0.369] [0.336] [0.212] [0.211] [0.339] [0.374] [0.361] [0.205] [0.203]
Dummy. Strict currency area 0.259 -0.016 0.082 1.013 1.018 0.191 -0.033 0.054 1.023 1.026 0.111 -0.024 0.033 1.024 1.025
[0.288] [0.362] [0.370] [0.259]*** [0.259]*** [0.290] [0.355] [0.346] [0.255]*** [0.255]*** [0.293] [0.363] [0.363] [0.256]*** [0.256]***
Dummy for regional trade agreement 0.088 0.373 0.333 0.293 0.276 0.042 0.367 0.331 0.327 0.307 0.054 0.405 0.352 0.350 0.334
[0.338] [0.333] [0.381] [0.143]** [0.138]** [0.342] [0.348] [0.374] [0.155]** [0.149]** [0.343] [0.347] [0.376] [0.163]** [0.157]**
GDP growth correlations 0.292 0.149 0.321 -0.213 -0.200 0.298 0.157 0.288 -0.270 -0.255 0.308 0.142 0.281 -0.340 -0.319
[0.286] [0.306] [0.259] [0.192] [0.194] [0.291] [0.315] [0.265] [0.237] [0.238] [0.290] [0.326] [0.272] [0.240] [0.245]
Similarity in K/L ratio -7.015 -9.144 -10.035 -8.370 -8.014 -7.639 -9.341 -10.391 -8.388 -8.025 -7.075 -9.145 -10.128 -8.052 -7.795
[2.596]*** [3.647]** [3.091]*** [2.470]*** [2.447]*** [2.620]*** [3.929]** [3.228]*** [2.491]*** [2.467]*** [2.644]*** [3.704]** [3.234]*** [2.538]*** [2.540]***
Similarity in K/L ratio*log(GDP) 0.278 0.365 0.402 0.316 0.304 0.300 0.372 0.412 0.316 0.304 0.296 0.362 0.405 0.309 0.301
[0.094]*** [0.130]*** [0.116]*** [0.084]*** [0.084]*** [0.095]*** [0.140]** [0.120]*** [0.085]*** [0.085]*** [0.095]*** [0.131]** [0.118]*** [0.090]*** [0.091]***
Similarity in exports -6.772 -3.460 -4.378 -10.565 -10.587 -11.973 -5.383 -8.885 -11.357 -11.528 -8.876 -6.825 -8.397 -7.492 -6.609
[18.655] [15.914] [13.439] [10.077] [9.972] [18.756] [17.407] [14.583] [9.353] [9.245] [18.807] [17.151] [14.345] [11.004] [11.014]
Similarity in exports*log(GDP) 0.251 0.224 0.159 0.348 0.345 0.450 0.306 0.322 0.372 0.373 0.332 0.357 0.301 0.228 0.189
[0.687] [0.580] [0.499] [0.336] [0.330] [0.690] [0.631] [0.528] [0.309] [0.303] [0.692] [0.623] [0.516] [0.374] [0.373]
Correlation stock returns -0.188 -0.230 0.515 0.376 0.351 -0.026 -0.340 0.477 0.420 0.426
[0.670] [0.483] [0.460] [0.373] [0.372] [0.680] [0.483] [0.394] [0.414] [0.411]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.564 -0.211 -0.369 -0.019 -0.042 -0.559 -0.188 -0.353 -0.032 -0.054
[0.237]** [0.315] [0.218] [0.234] [0.234] [0.238]** [0.301] [0.224] [0.227] [0.229]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.671 0.274 -0.026 -0.291 -0.393
[0.413] [0.451] [0.485] [0.656] [0.640]
Time difference 0.021 0.021 0.027 0.034 0.033
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
Observations 468 390 468 390 468 461 383 461 383 461 461 383 461 383 461
GDP positive interaction threshold: 25.23 25.05 24.96 26.49 26.36 25.46 25.11 25.22 26.54 26.40 23.90 25.26 25.01 26.06 25.90
GDP 5% significance threshold: 26.86 26.71 25.95 28.34 28.32 27.08 26.75 26.15 28.41 28.39 26.22 27.15 26.64 28.18 28.14
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91
Pseudo R-squared 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.47 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
Table 5. Source countries: Full sample. Host countries: OECD sample. Interaction term: sample split in two parts based on host GDP size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.286 0.111 0.114 0.146 0.155 0.274 0.113 0.080 0.156 0.163 0.291 0.101 0.081 0.173 0.176
[0.139]** [0.180] [0.214] [0.133] [0.133] [0.141]* [0.180] [0.214] [0.127] [0.127] [0.141]** [0.180] [0.216] [0.133] [0.133]
Log of distance -0.289 -0.428 -0.390 -0.013 -0.014 -0.314 -0.436 -0.396 0.020 0.015 -0.389 -0.489 -0.470 0.008 0.004
[0.180] [0.212]* [0.237] [0.123] [0.123] [0.183]* [0.211]** [0.235] [0.125] [0.125] [0.195]** [0.209]** [0.225]** [0.118] [0.118]
Common legal origin 0.499 0.523 0.494 -0.148 -0.152 0.543 0.556 0.529 -0.152 -0.154 0.543 0.545 0.517 -0.038 -0.042
[0.168]*** [0.179]*** [0.132]*** [0.168] [0.169] [0.170]*** [0.177]*** [0.129]*** [0.169] [0.169] [0.170]*** [0.175]*** [0.127]*** [0.166] [0.166]
Dummy for common border 0.136 0.193 0.270 0.428 0.422 0.116 0.175 0.255 0.421 0.412 0.045 0.182 0.239 0.445 0.436
[0.319] [0.331] [0.327] [0.131]*** [0.132]*** [0.320] [0.338] [0.318] [0.138]*** [0.139]*** [0.322] [0.344] [0.330] [0.141]*** [0.143]***
Dummy for common language 0.349 0.055 0.179 0.532 0.535 0.394 0.109 0.183 0.503 0.507 0.333 0.105 0.166 0.466 0.471
[0.250] [0.229] [0.243] [0.193]*** [0.191]*** [0.255] [0.246] [0.257] [0.194]*** [0.192]*** [0.257] [0.241] [0.237] [0.179]*** [0.177]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.071 0.372 0.233 -0.172 -0.179 0.127 0.393 0.262 -0.152 -0.160 0.239 0.454 0.345 -0.106 -0.118
[0.325] [0.374] [0.337] [0.214] [0.213] [0.331] [0.385] [0.342] [0.216] [0.215] [0.340] [0.394] [0.368] [0.206] [0.205]
Dummy. Strict currency area 0.212 -0.071 0.021 1.012 1.019 0.141 -0.091 -0.008 1.022 1.026 0.057 -0.085 -0.033 1.024 1.026
[0.288] [0.373] [0.376] [0.253]*** [0.253]*** [0.291] [0.368] [0.353] [0.248]*** [0.248]*** [0.294] [0.377] [0.369] [0.250]*** [0.250]***
Dummy for regional trade agreement 0.088 0.367 0.370 0.315 0.298 0.042 0.358 0.367 0.347 0.326 0.058 0.401 0.391 0.410 0.397
[0.340] [0.347] [0.389] [0.124]** [0.121]** [0.344] [0.366] [0.383] [0.134]*** [0.131]** [0.345] [0.365] [0.385] [0.158]*** [0.151]***
GDP growth correlations 0.300 0.164 0.323 -0.266 -0.250 0.308 0.179 0.296 -0.351 -0.334 0.317 0.163 0.288 -0.416 -0.388
[0.287] [0.311] [0.261] [0.173] [0.175] [0.292] [0.321] [0.269] [0.209]* [0.211] [0.292] [0.331] [0.276] [0.215]* [0.220]*
Similarity in K/L ratio (Small countries) 0.146 0.408 0.338 -0.680 -0.628 0.079 0.408 0.279 -0.720 -0.664 0.584 0.350 0.366 -0.607 -0.553
[0.325] [0.402] [0.209] [0.477] [0.471] [0.338] [0.403] [0.212] [0.466] [0.460] [0.441] [0.435] [0.388] [0.457] [0.449]
Similarity in K/L ratio (Large countries) 0.809 1.110 1.301 0.709 0.722 0.800 1.137 1.254 0.695 0.711 1.298 1.060 1.329 0.843 0.857
[0.282]*** [0.311]*** [0.275]*** [0.360]** [0.366]** [0.293]*** [0.313]*** [0.265]*** [0.363]* [0.370]* [0.405]*** [0.367]*** [0.382]*** [0.402]** [0.412]**
Similarity in exports (Small countries) 0.702 3.077 0.737 -0.917 -1.045 0.737 3.319 0.519 -1.142 -1.278 0.733 3.194 0.453 -1.095 -1.253
[2.614] [2.044] [2.537] [2.217] [2.194] [2.637] [2.070] [2.698] [2.190] [2.172] [2.631] [2.077] [2.690] [2.093] [2.065]
Similarity in exports (Large countries) 0.449 3.504 0.692 1.142 0.989 0.933 3.953 0.877 0.970 0.823 0.688 3.891 0.710 0.611 0.410
[2.732] [2.294] [2.841] [2.201] [2.152] [2.753] [2.271]* [2.886] [2.138] [2.094] [2.752] [2.286] [2.838] [1.962] [1.918]
Correlation stock returns -0.240 -0.316 0.422 0.492 0.467 -0.078 -0.431 0.380 0.552 0.551
[0.673] [0.519] [0.439] [0.339] [0.338] [0.682] [0.523] [0.371] [0.395] [0.390]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.547 -0.196 -0.344 -0.083 -0.106 -0.541 -0.168 -0.326 -0.104 -0.126
[0.238]** [0.311] [0.210] [0.213] [0.215] [0.238]** [0.301] [0.216] [0.208] [0.210]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.702 0.265 -0.041 -0.301 -0.383
[0.414]* [0.454] [0.484] [0.515] [0.497]
Time difference 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.035 0.033
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Observations 468 390 468 390 468 461 383 461 383 461 461 383 461 383 461
H0: coef[KL_small]=coef[KL_large]: 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91
Pseudo R-squared 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.47 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
Table 6. World Bank sample of High Income and Upper Middle Income countries. Interaction term: ln(GDP) with host countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.538 0.326 0.388 0.133 0.143 0.551 0.341 0.371 0.138 0.147 0.576 0.328 0.380 0.164 0.173
[0.121]*** [0.137]** [0.177]** [0.132] [0.132] [0.127]*** [0.153]** [0.187]* [0.131] [0.131] [0.128]*** [0.154]** [0.199]* [0.128] [0.127]
Log of distance -0.144 -0.288 -0.208 -0.042 -0.038 -0.128 -0.276 -0.204 -0.024 -0.023 -0.151 -0.268 -0.212 -0.038 -0.037
[0.161] [0.151]* [0.202] [0.120] [0.120] [0.166] [0.150]* [0.203] [0.120] [0.120] [0.171] [0.145]* [0.198] [0.114] [0.114]
Common legal origin 0.370 0.372 0.355 -0.072 -0.075 0.414 0.413 0.404 -0.078 -0.079 0.409 0.411 0.401 0.026 0.026
[0.151]** [0.152]** [0.119]*** [0.158] [0.159] [0.155]*** [0.168]** [0.126]*** [0.161] [0.162] [0.156]*** [0.173]** [0.129]*** [0.151] [0.151]
Dummy for common border 0.286 0.183 0.302 0.442 0.436 0.258 0.155 0.253 0.439 0.431 0.211 0.185 0.241 0.466 0.455
[0.297] [0.288] [0.308] [0.133]*** [0.135]*** [0.299] [0.287] [0.294] [0.138]*** [0.140]*** [0.300] [0.289] [0.289] [0.140]*** [0.143]***
Dummy for common language 0.361 0.153 0.321 0.494 0.496 0.399 0.198 0.347 0.475 0.478 0.353 0.215 0.332 0.437 0.439
[0.227] [0.176] [0.198] [0.180]*** [0.179]*** [0.236]* [0.187] [0.211] [0.184]*** [0.183]*** [0.240] [0.187] [0.204] [0.167]*** [0.166]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.236 0.384 0.280 -0.226 -0.232 0.297 0.414 0.307 -0.213 -0.219 0.343 0.400 0.324 -0.166 -0.175
[0.298] [0.337] [0.296] [0.205] [0.205] [0.308] [0.346] [0.304] [0.210] [0.210] [0.315] [0.346] [0.324] [0.207] [0.206]
Dummy. Strict currency area 0.021 -0.025 -0.010 0.988 0.993 -0.091 -0.058 -0.042 0.995 0.996 -0.163 -0.010 -0.066 0.996 0.998
[0.270] [0.318] [0.332] [0.250]*** [0.250]*** [0.277] [0.323] [0.318] [0.247]*** [0.247]*** [0.281] [0.339] [0.333] [0.251]*** [0.250]***
Dummy for regional trade agreement -0.026 -0.046 0.026 0.205 0.195 -0.104 -0.081 -0.031 0.220 0.208 -0.111 -0.079 -0.033 0.249 0.240
[0.295] [0.284] [0.277] [0.133] [0.130] [0.305] [0.265] [0.266] [0.139] [0.135] [0.305] [0.270] [0.267] [0.150]* [0.145]*
GDP growth correlations 0.440 0.337 0.552 -0.224 -0.213 0.486 0.377 0.528 -0.259 -0.248 0.518 0.355 0.540 -0.329 -0.312
[0.271] [0.312] [0.304]* [0.196] [0.197] [0.277]* [0.317] [0.309] [0.235] [0.236] [0.278]* [0.319] [0.315]* [0.248] [0.251]
Similarity in K/L ratio -7.166 -6.953 -9.231 -7.843 -7.560 -6.569 -5.864 -8.023 -7.815 -7.541 -6.044 -6.114 -7.848 -7.484 -7.293
[2.920]** [3.074]** [3.515]** [2.510]*** [2.512]*** [2.979]** [2.656]** [3.047]** [2.535]*** [2.537]*** [2.997]** [2.700]** [3.025]** [2.585]*** [2.602]***
Similarity in K/L ratio*log(GDP) 0.280 0.282 0.363 0.298 0.289 0.258 0.243 0.318 0.297 0.288 0.255 0.243 0.317 0.290 0.284
[0.107]*** [0.116]** [0.131]** [0.086]*** [0.086]*** [0.109]** [0.100]** [0.114]*** [0.087]*** [0.088]*** [0.109]** [0.098]** [0.114]** [0.093]*** [0.094]***
Similarity in exports 5.321 8.271 -1.869 -7.118 -7.082 -2.356 3.646 -7.422 -7.855 -8.000 0.276 1.809 -6.724 -5.108 -4.224
[18.206] [15.205] [16.515] [9.176] [9.046] [18.827] [17.979] [19.075] [8.635] [8.522] [18.891] [18.361] [19.383] [9.925] [9.897]
Similarity in exports*log(GDP) -0.217 -0.245 0.054 0.225 0.220 0.061 -0.060 0.265 0.248 0.249 -0.042 0.007 0.236 0.144 0.108
[0.674] [0.541] [0.579] [0.299] [0.292] [0.695] [0.641] [0.672] [0.279] [0.273] [0.698] [0.657] [0.684] [0.334] [0.332]
Correlation stock returns -0.080 -0.305 0.312 0.274 0.258 0.041 -0.376 0.350 0.293 0.306
[0.605] [0.492] [0.308] [0.344] [0.344] [0.611] [0.539] [0.306] [0.374] [0.373]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.528 -0.155 -0.264 -0.028 -0.051 -0.517 -0.159 -0.259 -0.035 -0.057
[0.218]** [0.346] [0.233] [0.224] [0.224] [0.218]** [0.350] [0.232] [0.220] [0.221]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.599 0.381 -0.183 -0.209 -0.308
[0.384] [0.517] [0.462] [0.591] [0.574]
Time difference 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.036 0.035
[0.024] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
Observations 546 471 546 471 546 521 449 521 449 521 521 449 521 449 521
GDP positive interaction threshold: 25.59 24.66 25.43 26.32 26.16 25.46 24.13 25.23 26.31 26.18 23.70 25.16 24.76 25.81 25.68
GDP 5% significance threshold: 26.68 26.92 26.43 27.96 27.92 26.69 26.71 26.27 27.98 27.94 26.04 27.92 26.76 27.72 27.67
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89
Pseudo R-squared 0.46 0.96 0.96 0.46 0.96 0.96 0.46 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
Table 7. World Bank sample of High Income and Upper Middle Income countries. Interaction term: sample split in two parts based on host GDP size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Tobit OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0 Equity>0 Equity>=0
Log of bilateral trade 0.522 0.316 0.376 0.179 0.188 0.544 0.335 0.369 0.185 0.193 0.572 0.323 0.381 0.202 0.207
[0.121]*** [0.139]** [0.173]** [0.122] [0.123] [0.127]*** [0.154]** [0.184]* [0.119] [0.120] [0.128]*** [0.156]** [0.196]* [0.121]* [0.122]*
Log of distance -0.172 -0.298 -0.244 0.006 0.008 -0.158 -0.286 -0.242 0.027 0.025 -0.188 -0.287 -0.261 0.008 0.006
[0.161] [0.153]* [0.202] [0.110] [0.112] [0.166] [0.154]* [0.204] [0.110] [0.111] [0.171] [0.150]* [0.201] [0.107] [0.108]
Common legal origin 0.389 0.391 0.361 -0.122 -0.125 0.426 0.427 0.405 -0.127 -0.128 0.417 0.423 0.398 -0.015 -0.017
[0.151]** [0.152]** [0.119]*** [0.157] [0.158] [0.155]*** [0.169]** [0.127]*** [0.159] [0.160] [0.156]*** [0.174]** [0.128]*** [0.148] [0.148]
Dummy for common border 0.250 0.164 0.246 0.401 0.396 0.218 0.135 0.198 0.390 0.383 0.171 0.163 0.187 0.428 0.417
[0.297] [0.286] [0.298] [0.132]*** [0.134]*** [0.299] [0.286] [0.288] [0.137]*** [0.138]*** [0.301] [0.289] [0.286] [0.137]*** [0.140]***
Dummy for common language 0.342 0.133 0.298 0.504 0.507 0.395 0.189 0.341 0.480 0.484 0.341 0.199 0.313 0.443 0.447
[0.227] [0.186] [0.205] [0.181]*** [0.180]*** [0.236]* [0.193] [0.217] [0.182]*** [0.181]*** [0.240] [0.194] [0.208] [0.169]*** [0.167]***
Dummy for ever colony/colonizer 0.241 0.380 0.298 -0.168 -0.174 0.303 0.408 0.324 -0.149 -0.154 0.365 0.403 0.360 -0.098 -0.108
[0.297] [0.339] [0.292] [0.211] [0.211] [0.307] [0.346] [0.295] [0.214] [0.214] [0.314] [0.349] [0.316] [0.210] [0.209]
Dummy. Strict currency area -0.000 -0.051 -0.037 0.987 0.992 -0.119 -0.083 -0.074 0.992 0.995 -0.195 -0.043 -0.107 0.995 0.997
[0.269] [0.322] [0.331] [0.244]*** [0.245]*** [0.276] [0.330] [0.318] [0.241]*** [0.241]*** [0.280] [0.348] [0.331] [0.245]*** [0.245]***
Dummy for regional trade agreement -0.053 -0.072 -0.010 0.234 0.224 -0.131 -0.108 -0.067 0.249 0.237 -0.131 -0.105 -0.064 0.303 0.298
[0.293] [0.281] [0.272] [0.110]** [0.108]** [0.303] [0.263] [0.264] [0.118]** [0.116]** [0.303] [0.269] [0.266] [0.145]** [0.138]**
GDP growth correlations 0.449 0.358 0.562 -0.266 -0.252 0.507 0.400 0.553 -0.328 -0.314 0.538 0.381 0.568 -0.399 -0.376
[0.270]* [0.323] [0.312]* [0.179] [0.180] [0.276]* [0.326] [0.317]* [0.214] [0.215] [0.276]* [0.330] [0.326]* [0.229]* [0.233]
Similarity in K/L ratio (Small countries) -0.043 0.352 0.021 -0.556 -0.521 -0.016 0.441 0.106 -0.582 -0.547 0.432 0.212 0.262 -0.484 -0.438
[0.244] [0.426] [0.234] [0.446] [0.441] [0.251] [0.444] [0.213] [0.435] [0.430] [0.373] [0.418] [0.344] [0.415] [0.407]
Similarity in K/L ratio (Large countries) 0.737 0.931 0.969 0.724 0.731 0.722 0.942 0.953 0.721 0.730 1.168 0.713 1.112 0.862 0.880
[0.205]*** [0.378]** [0.241]*** [0.295]** [0.298]** [0.209]*** [0.369]** [0.232]*** [0.295]** [0.299]** [0.345]*** [0.376]* [0.395]*** [0.339]** [0.349]**
Similarity in exports (Small countries) 0.129 2.107 -0.012 -0.982 -1.066 -0.452 2.202 -0.142 -1.204 -1.304 -0.582 2.139 -0.267 -1.139 -1.252
[2.310] [2.528] [2.863] [2.153] [2.125] [2.371] [2.680] [3.041] [2.150] [2.126] [2.375] [2.675] [3.061] [2.057] [2.023]
Similarity in exports (Large countries) -0.852 1.383 -0.114 0.819 0.710 -0.569 1.999 0.313 0.696 0.585 -0.792 1.970 0.150 0.389 0.241
[2.388] [2.433] [2.818] [2.131] [2.086] [2.418] [2.530] [2.979] [2.109] [2.068] [2.427] [2.558] [2.990] [1.948] [1.906]
Correlation stock returns -0.216 -0.368 0.109 0.386 0.370 -0.084 -0.433 0.162 0.407 0.414
[0.606] [0.501] [0.347] [0.316] [0.316] [0.611] [0.549] [0.337] [0.365] [0.360]
Correlation growth-stock returns -0.539 -0.156 -0.266 -0.099 -0.121 -0.529 -0.158 -0.261 -0.111 -0.135
[0.219]** [0.353] [0.229] [0.206] [0.207] [0.219]** [0.358] [0.228] [0.202] [0.204]
Similarity in log(GDP per capita) -0.619 0.348 -0.217 -0.198 -0.274
[0.381] [0.510] [0.447] [0.480] [0.462]
Time difference 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.037 0.036
[0.024] [0.025] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024]
Observations 546 471 546 471 546 521 449 521 449 521 521 449 521 449 521
H0: coef[KL_small]=coef[KL_large]: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96 0.44 0.96 0.96
Note: Equity holdings of source country i  in host country j  are measured in millions of US dollars. Dependent variable is ln(1+Equity) in the case of OLS and Tobit, while it is Equity in Poisson estimations.
Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The Pseudo R-squared available for Poisson are without clustering.
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